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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5864 
TOWN OF PAWLING, 
Employer. 
BARNES, IACCARINO, VIRGINIA, AMBINDER & SHEPHERD, PLLC 
(EMILY A. ROSCIA, Esq. of Counsel) for Petitioner 
SHAW, PERELSON, MAY & LAMBERT, LLP (DAVID S. SHAW, ESQ. of 
Counsel) for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 22, 2009, Local 456,. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification, as the exclusive representative of 
certain employees of the Town of Pawling (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: Cleaner, Clerk to Town Justice, Groundskeeper, Head 
Greenskeeper, Head Groundskeeper, Laborer, Maintenance 
Worker, Recreation Leader, Secretary to the Planning Board and 
Zoning Board of Appeals, SeniorTypist, Typist and Teen Center 
Director. 
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Excluded: Building Inspector 1/MS4 officer, Constable, Recreation Director, 
Bookkeeper to Supervisor, Summer Camp Counselor, Seasonal 
and/or Part-Time Recreation Assistant and all other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on August 12, 
2010, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5995 
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA AND SHERIFF 
OF CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY, 
Joint Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding.having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named joint public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Part-time Deputy Sheriffs employed by the Chautauqua County 
Sheriff's Office. 
Excluded: All other employees of Chautauqua County. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named joint public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
~7J Jerome Lefk^witz,/Ctrairman ~~ 
/ Sheila S. Cote, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLERICAL & MAINTENANCE UNION OF THE 
BUFFALO AND ERIE COUNTY PUBLIC 
LIBRARY - CONTRACTING LIBRARIES, 
NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5991 
ALDEN (EWELL) FREE LIBRARY, ET AL, 
CONTRACTING MEMBER LIBRARIES, WITHIN 
THE BUFFALO AND ERIE COUNTY PUBLIC 
LIBRARY SYSTEM, 
^ Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Clerical & Maintenance Union of the Buffalo 
and Erie County Public Library-Contracting Libraries, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
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employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time clerical and maintenance 
employees employed by Alden (Ewell) Free Library, et al, 
Contracting Member Libraries, individually, within the Buffalo & Erie 
County Public Library System. 
Excluded: Managers, including Library Managers, confidential employees and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Clerical & Maintenance Union of the Buffalo and Erie 
County Public Library-Contracting Libraries, NYSUT/AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 9,2010 ^f . 
Albany, New York A / j j Sj 
/ / J e r o m e Lefkow/tz, Chafpfrian 
%gXj^/'<2 
' Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 30, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5947 
HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST, 
i 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted.in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, - • 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International. Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 30 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5947 page 2 
Included: All full-time Chief Facilities Engineer, Assistant Director of 
Maintenance Operations, Mechanics, Maintenance Technician 
(Non-Trade), Maintenance Technician (Trade), Maintenance 
Technician (Horticultural), Motorpool Specialist, Operations 
Coordinator and Director of Marine Operations. 
Excluded: All other employees, including seasonal and part-time employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 30. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
.//i^on* ^ J-^fJy0m. 
Jerome Lefkoywtz, Chaipman 
71, y^JJ^ ^-s^cj-C^ 
Sheila S. Cole.lvlember 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 106, 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Party; 
-and- CASE NO. U-24765 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
. Respondent. 
COLLERAN, O'HARA & MILLS L.L'.P. (EDWARD J. GROARKE of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(ROBERT K. DRINAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed both by the Transport Workers 
Union, Local 106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) and the New York City 
Transit Authority (NYCTA), to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by TSO, as amended, alleging that NYCTA violated 
§§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).1 The 
charge alleges that NYCTA has engaged in a pattern and practice of reducing the 
number of Subway Supervisor Level II (SSI.I) positions in the TSO unit through attrition 
since 1997, imposed disproportionate discipline on unit employees and refused TSO's 
request to negotiate the impact of the reduction in the number of unit employees. As 
1
 41 PERB 1J4599 (2008). 
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part of its amended charge, TSO alleges that NYCTA failed to fill four vacant SSII 
positions in September and November 2003, imposed disproportionate discipline on 
unit members in September and December 2003, and refused TSO's September 2003 
demand to negotiate the impact of the reduction in the size of the unit. 
At the request of the parties, there were lengthy delays in the processing of the 
charge based upon an expectation that related litigation would result in the resolution of 
the charge.2 After presiding over four days of hearing, during which the parties were 
permitted to present multiple witnesses and documents about their extensive labor 
relations history, the ALJ issued a decision finding that NYCTA violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act by refusing to negotiate the impact of the reduction in the number of unit 
' positions, and dismissing the remainder of TSO's charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, TSO challenges the ALJ's dismissal of its claim that NYCTA 
violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act on the grounds that NYCTA's cumulative 
conduct, including actions taken in September, November and December 2003, 
demonstrate a pattern and practice of improper motivation under the Act toward TSO 
and its unit employees. As part of its exceptions, TSO seeks reversal of Board 
precedent rejecting the application of a continuing violation theory under the Act. It also 
seeks a finding that NYCTA engaged in a continuing violation by failing to fill SSII 
vacancies, and by increasing the frequency and magnitude of disciplinary action against 
2
 Supra, note 1, 41 PERB 514599 at 4824, n.1. 
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unit members including TSO activists. In addition, TSO contends that the failure to fill 
SSI I positions constitutes a perse violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. NYCTA 
supports the ALJ's dismissal of TSO claims pursuant to §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
NYCTA excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that it failed to negotiate the impact of 
the reduction in the number of employees in the TSO unit in violation of §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act. According to NYCTA, the evidence establishes that it engaged in impact 
negotiations with TSO, and that it has never refused to bargain impact. TSO supports -
the ALJ's finding that NYCTA violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act. 
Based upon our review of the record, and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. We briefly review the evidence 
with respect to the 13 years of diverse facts and procedural history relied upon by TSO 
in support of its exceptions, as well as the evidence relating to the ALJ's conclusion that 
NYCTA violated its duty to engage in impact negotiations in response to a TSO 
demand. • ' 
In 1984, the SSII position was created by NYCTA as part of its reorganization of 
supervisory responsibilities. For seven years after the creation of the position, NYCTA 
steadily increased the number of employees holding SSII positions. In 1992, NYCTA 
opposed TSO's representation petition seeking to represent a new unit of SSII 
employees. NYCTA's opposition was premised upon two grounds: waiver based upon 
a prior NYCTA-TSO side agreement, and a claim that some of the employees were 
o Case No. U-24765 -4 
managerial or confidential. After the managerial/confidential issue was resolved 
through an agreement to exclude certain SSI I employees from the proposed unit, 
NYCTA unsuccessfully pursued its waiver argument before the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director), the Board, and in court.3 On 
February 24, 1995, TSO was certified to represent a unit of SSII employees in the 
NYCTA's Division of Stations, with certain SSII positions excluded consistent with the 
parties' stipulation.4 
The final resolution of NYCTA's arguments in opposition to the representation 
petition led to a delay in the commencement of negotiations between the parties. 
Ultimately, the parties reached a one-year agreement in September 1999 that was 
followed by a successor three-year agreement, which expired on September 30, 2003. 
The parties did not reach another agreement until 2008. 
Between 1995 and the filing of TSO's charge in the present case, NYCTA 
discontinued filling SSII positions when they became vacant, resulting in a steady 
decline in the number of TSO unit employees as well as a decrease in the number of 
SSII positions that are excluded from the unit. According to TSO witnesses, the 
undisputed drop in SSII staffing, along with NYCTA's enlargement of the areas 
supervised by SSII employees, increased the workload for the remaining SSII 
3
 NYCTA, 27 PERB 1J4038 (1994), affd, 27 PERB 1J3060 (1994), confirmed sub nom. 
NYCTA v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 232 AD2d 492, 29 PERB fl7018 (2d Dept 
1996). 
4
 NYCTA, 28 PERB fl3000.05 (1995). 
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employees, and. decreased the number of available preferred assignments for TSO unit 
employees. 
In 1998, the parties resolved a TSO improper practice charge alleging that 
NYCTA violated the Act when it reassigned two recently elected TSO officers from their 
SSII desk positions. Under the terms of the settlement, the TSO officers were returned 
to their SSII desk positions with the caveat that they would not conduct TSO activities 
during work time. In addition, the agreement preserved NYCTA's contention that the 
SSII desk positions were confidential under the Act. 
Commencing, in 1999, there was an increase in the frequency of disciplinary 
allegations made against TSO unit employees resulting from a change in NYCTA's. 
disciplinary procedure. In 2000, a TSO officer was served with multiple separate 
disciplinary charges alleging assorted forms of misconduct. Many of those charges 
were withdrawn, and others were settled with a warning or retraining. 
In 2002, the Board dismissed a TSO charge alleging that NYCTA violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Act in 2001 by unilaterally reassigning SSII supervisory duties to Station 
Supervisor Level I (SSI) employees, who are not in the TSO unit. The charge was 
dismissed based upon a finding that TSO lacked exclusivity over those supervisory 
duties.5 A subsequent TSO charge in 2004, which alleged the unilateral transfer of 
5
 NYCTA, 35 PERB 1J3028 (2002) confirmed sub norm. Romaine v Cuevas, 305 AD2d 
968, 36 PERB1T7010 (3d Dept2003). 
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other supervisory duties, was similarly dismissed.6 In addition, TSO unsuccessfully 
pursued contract grievances over changes in the work hours and preference 
assignments of SSIl employees. 
In September and November 2003, NYCTA did not fill four additional SSIl 
positions that had become vacant. In September and December 2003, NYCTA 
imposed discipline on a total of 13 TSO unit members.. . 
In September and October 2003, TSO made written requests for impact 
negotiations with respect to NYCTA's decisions to not fill vacant SSIl positions and to 
expand the areas supervised by SSIl employees. The requests were made following 
prior conversations between the parties about the subjects. In response to TSO's 
requests for impact negotiations, NYCTA met with TSO, but it did not agree to 
commence impact negotiations. Instead, it told TSO to pursue a related grievance to 
arbitration.7 In June 2006, the issues raised in TSO's 2003 requests for impact 
negotiations were discussed between the parties as part of contract negotiations for a 
new agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
Our discussion begins with TSO's contention that NYCTA's cumulative conduct, 
6
 NYCTA, 38 PERB1J3024 (2005). Despite our 2002 and 2005 rulings, the ALJ 
permitted TSO to introduce evidence regarding NYCTA's reassignment of SSIl duties to 
SSI employees, which TSO relies upon to support its exceptions. See, Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Charging Party's Exceptions, pp. 3, 6-7. 
7
 The parties, however, did meet in January 2004 to discuss TSO's concerns with 
respect to 2004 SSIl preference assignments including the change in hours. 
Transcript, pp. 370-74, 559-61. 
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including NYCTA's actions in September, November and December 2003, demonstrate 
a pattern and practice of improperly motivated acts toward TSO and its unit employees 
in violation of §§209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
In support of its argument, TSO does not cite any precedent recognizing a 
pattern and practice claim under the Act, nor does it articulate a proposed standard for 
determining such a claim. Although our case law permits a charging party to introduce 
evidence of a contentious labor relations history, including prior employer anti-union 
acts or statements, to prove a timely alleged violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act,8 we have not previously addressed a pattern and practice claim by an employee • 
organization.9 -
We need not address TSO's purported pattern and practice claim because it 
consists of nothing more than an amalgam of mostly unrelated factual and legal 
disputes between the parties over a 13-year period, without sufficient evidence 
demonstrating improper motivation or perse violations of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
8
 See, Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB 1J3079 (1995); Erie County Water Auth, 27 PERB 
1J3010 (1995); Port Jervis City Sch Dist (McAndrew), 33 PERB fl3027 (2.000). The 
potential admissibility of such evidence does not remove an ALJ's discretion to exclude 
such evidence when he or she determines that it is not probative or relevant to the . 
alleged improperly motivated employer action that is the subject of the charge. Among 
the effective means for avoiding an unnecessarily voluminous record is to require 
parties to submit offers of proof or to permit motions in limine. 
9
 We note, however, that the New York Charter School Act of 1998, Educ Law §2850 et 
seq. expressly grants our agency jurisdiction to determine a pattern and practice claim 
against a charter school under §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. See, Educ Law 
§2855.1 (d).. ' . ' ' 
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Contrary to TSO's contention, NYCTA's objections to TSO's 1992 representation 
petition do not establish improper animus or constitute a perse violation of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. NYCTA had a right to contest the representation petition, 
including challenging the appropriateness of the proposed unit. Similarly, the mere 
failure of the parties to expeditiously reach a negotiated first agreement, and 
subsequent agreements, does not evince interference or discrimination by NYCTA 
under the Act. 
The evidence of adverse actions NYCTA took against unit officers and other SSI I 
employees does not support TSO's alleged pattern and practice claim. The terms of the 
1998 settlement of TSO's improper practice charge regarding the reassignment of the 
two TSO unit officers constitutes the law of the case and, therefore, the motivational 
issue regarding those transfers cannot be resurrected as part of an alleged pattern and 
practice claim.11 Furthermore, the record fully supports the ALJ's finding that TSO 
failed to demonstrate that the increase in the number and severity of the disciplinary 
charges against the TSO unit officer and SSI I unit employees between 1999 and 2003 
were improperly motivated. TSO failed to meet its burden, through direct or 
circumstantial evidence, to demonstrate that the disciplinary actions taken since 1999 
10
 See, UFT, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB tf3007 (2008), confirmed sub 
nom. Jenkins v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 41 PERB 1J7007 (Sup Ct New York 
County 2008) affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB ^7008 (1st Dept 2009). 
11
 In addition, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that TSO failed to demonstrate during the 
hearing that the transfers were improperly motivated. 
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were unlawfully motivated in violation of §§209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act. 
We also reject TSO's contention that NYCTA's practice of not filling vacant SSII 
positions since 1995, and the alleged adverse impact the practice has had on the 
remaining unit members, demonstrates a pattern and practice of violations of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act. It is well-settled that, in the absence of proof of improper 
motivation under the Act, an employer's decision to abolish or not fill a position does not 
violate the Act.12 In the present case, TSO fails to demonstrate that NYCTA was 
motivated by improper animus in failing to fill vacant SSII positions. In fact, during the 
lengthy period cited by TSO, NYCTA did not fill any SSII position whether within or 
excluded from the TSO unit. 
Our decision in New York City Transit Authority13 is inapplicable to the facts and 
circumstances of the present case. In New York City Transit Authority, we found a per 
se violation of §§209-a. 1 (a) and (c) of the Act based upon evidence that an employer 
abolished 75 percent of the bargaining unit's positions after the successful negotiation 
of a first contract, and replaced those abolished positions with new managerial 
positions. Unlike that case, the evidence in the present case does not demonstrate that 
NYCTA's decision not to fill vacant SSII positions inherently undermines and interferes 
12
 See, County of Schenectady and the Schenectady County Sheriff, 18 PERB 1J3038 
(1985); State of New York (Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities), 
24 PERB P036 (1991). 
13
 21 PERB 1J3007 (1988), confirmed sub nom. New York City Transit Auth v New York 
State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 154 AD2d 680, 22 PERB 1J7036 (2d Dept 1989), order 
modified, 154 AD2d 680, 22 PERB 1T7037 (2d Dept 1989). 
Case No. U-24765 -10-
with TSO's ability to represent its unit members. Moreover, NYCTA established 
legitimate business reasons for decreasing the number of SSII positions. 
Next, we consider TSO's request that we reexamine our case law rejecting the 
application of a continuing violation theory with respect to the timeframe for the filing of 
an improper practice charge under §204.1 (a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules).14 It is 
well-settled that we strictly construe the timeframe under our Rules for the filing of a 
charge.15 Based upon our conclusions today that TSO failed to prove that NYCTA's 
conduct over the 13-year period violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, it is 
unnecessary for us to reconsider our timeliness doctrine. 
Finally, we consider NYCTA's exceptions to the ALJ's decision finding that it 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the. Act when it failed to commence impact negotiations as 
requested by TSO. The evidence establishes that in response to TSO's September 
and October 2003. requests for impact negotiations regarding the reduction in unit 
employees, NYCTA did not agree to begin impact negotiations. Instead, it directed 
TSO to pursue a contract remedy. Negotiations on the impact of NYCTA's failure to fill 
vacant SSII positions did not commence until June 2006, during contract negotiations 
for a successor agreement. 
14
 See, City of Yonkers, 7 PERB 1J3007 (1974); Village ofMalone, 8 PERB 1J3045 
(1975); UUP (Iden), 13 PERB 1J3086 (1980); Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth, 17 
PERB P017 (1984); NYCTA, 26 PERB 1J3081 (1993); State of New York (Dept of 
lns)(Shayne), 36 PERB 1J3026 (2003); CUNY, 40 PERB 1J3004 (2007), 
15
 See, City of Elmira, 25 PERB fl3072 (1992); City of Albany, 23 PERB |j3027 (1990) 
confirmed sub nom> City of Albany v Newman, 181 AD2d 953, 25 PERB 1J7002. (3d 
Dept 1992). 
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Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing TSO's 
allegations under §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, and her finding that NYCTA violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act, but modify the remedial order consistent with our recent 
precedent.16 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that NYCTA: 
.1. forthwith negotiate in good faith with TSO regarding the impact of the * . 
reduction in the number of SSIIs in the TSO unit; and . 
2. sign and post a notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
I ' V 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
\\/A<ryyU^. . . . 
/ / J e r o m e Lefk^witz, Chairperson 
^J P~ 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
16
 See, Town of Wallkill, 43 PERB 1J3026 (2010); County of Monroe, 43 PERB 1J3025 
2010). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority in the unit represented by 
the Transport Workers Union, Local 106, Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) that the New 
York City Transit Authority will forthwith negotiate in good faith with the TSO regarding the 
impact of the reduction in .the number of SSIIs. 
By 
(Representative) 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
Dated . . . . 
(Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 30, 
Petitioner, CASE NO. C-5947 
- and -
HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST, 
Employer. 
( • 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GLENNON & LEVINE, LLP (PAULA CLARITY of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
BOND, SCHOENECK& KING, PLLC (TERRY O'NEIL, RAYMOND J. 
PASCUCCI and LAUREN J. DARIENZO of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions by the Hudson River Park Trust 
(Trust) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) denying its election objections, filed pursuant to §201.9(h)(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), to a secret mail-ballot election with respect to a representation 
petition filed by International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 30 (Local 30) seeking 
to represent a unit of 16 Trust employees. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Trust contends that the Director erred by denying its 
objection concerning the failure of the PERB agent to count three mail-ballots. In 
addition, the Trust asserts that the Director erred in denying its objection to the PERB 
Case No. C-5947 - 2 -
agent's noncompliance with the procedure set forth, in County of Washington,^ with 
respect to a fourth timely ballot that was received in an unsigned envelope. Finally, the 
Trust excepts to the Director's decision not to set aside the election, and the Director's 
conclusion that Local 30 is entitled to be certified as the negotiating agent for the unit as 
the result of the election. Local 30 supports the Director's decision. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' . 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
On March 2, 2010, the PERB agent conducted.a conference with the parties, 
during which a consent agreement was executed, and the parties agreed to a schedule 
for the holding of a mail-ballot election with the ballot count to take place on April 19, 
2010. The parties signed a consent agreement for the conduct of the election that 
included a handwritten paragraph stating that, for the purpose of the agreement, Local 
30 waives the right to a certification without an election under our Rules and the parties^ 
agree to the holding of an election. 
The day after the conference, the PERB agent sent a confirming letter with the 
agreed-upon schedule, along with a copy of the notice of.election to be posted in the 
Trust's workplace.' Under the schedule, the notice would be posted in the workplace by 
the Trust by March 11, 2010, the ballots would be mailed by PERB to the eligible 
employees on March 23, 2010, and replacement ballots could be requested by eligible 
voters on March 31, 2010. The letter expressly stated that "[a]ll ballots must be received 
at PERB's Latham, New York post office box by 9:30 a.m. on April 15, 2010. Ballots 
1
 42 PERB 1J3021 (2009). 
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received after that date shall be void." 
Consistent with the schedule, the Trust posted the notice of election on its 
workplace kitchen bulletin board on March 11, 2010. The notice directed employees to: 
"Mail your signed envelope to the Public Employment Relations Board in time for it to 
arrive at our Latham post office box by 9:30 a.m. on April 15, 2010." The notice 
included a clear and unambiguous direction for the. voter to sign the return envelope: 
"SIGN YOUR FULL NAME ON THE SIGNATURE LINE ON THE BACK OF THE 
ENVELOPE!" The notice also stated that noncompliance with the instructions can result 
in the invalidation of a ballot. 
On March 23, 2010, PERB mailed the ballots to eligible Trust employees along 
with written directions and pre-paid return envelopes. Each voter was directed to mail 
the ballot to PERB "as soon as possible"in a signed return envelope. In addition, the 
directions stated that: . 
For your vote to be counted, you must have been an employee oh 
FEBRUARY 24, 2010 and still be so employed on APRIL 19, 2010. 
In addition, the envelope containing your ballot must arrive in our 
Latham post office box by 9:30 a.m. on April 15, 2010. 
Finally, the directions stated that: "Your failure to comply with the above directions 
may invalidate your ballot!" 
Thirteen ballots were received at PERB's post office box by the stipulated 
deadline of April 15, 2010 at 9:30 a.m. Those ballots were forwarded to the PERB agent 
for the scheduled April 19, 2010 ballot count. At the beginning of the count, one ballot 
was voided by the PERB argent on the ground that the return envelope was unsigned. 
The parties were not granted an opportunity to consent to the ballot being counted. The 
remaining 12 ballots were tallied by the PERB.agent. Seven votes were in favor of Local 
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30 representation, and five against. 
Following the vote count, PERB learned that two additional ballots from eligible 
employees were received at its post office box after the stipulated deadline, including 
one ballot that was received in an unsigned return envelope. The ballot in the unsigned 
return envelope, which was received on April 15, 2010 after the 9:30 a.m. deadline, was 
postmarked April 13, 2010. The other ballot, which was received on April 17, 2010, was 
postmarked April 14, 2010. 
During the course of the Director's investigation into the Trust's objections, 
pursuant to §201.9(h)(4) of the Rules, an affidavit was submitted by the employee whose 
ballot was received on April 15, 2010, stating that the ballot was mailed on or before April 
9, 2010. The second employee, whose ballot was received on April 17, 2010, submitted 
an affidavit stating that he mailed his ballot on or before April 8, 2010. Furthermore, a 
third employee submitted an affidavit stating that he mailed his ballot on April 10, 2010. 
However, PERB did not receive this third ballot. 
DISCUSSION 
Throughout our history, PERB has utilized mail-ballot elections, as well as on-site 
elections, in representation cases. Our longstanding procedure for conducting a mail-
ballot election includes the establishment of a schedule by the PERB agent at a 
conference with the parties. The schedule includes agreed-upon dates for the following:, 
employee eligibility, the employer's posting of the notice of election at the workplace, the 
employer's mailing to PERB a set of mailing labels containing the names and addresses 
of the unit employees employed on the eligibility date, PERB's mailing ballots to eligible 
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unit employees, employees' calling PERB for a replacement ballot, receipt of ballots and 
the ballot count. 
Voting instructions included in the notice of election set forth the date and specific 
time when ballots must be received at PERB's post office box, the obligation of a voter to 
sign the return envelope, along with a warning that the failure to comply with the 
instructions can invalidate a ballot. Similarly, the directions attached to the mail ballots 
sent to the eligible employees include the same information, and state that envelopes 
containing the ballots should be mailed to PERB "as soon as possible." Like the notice of 
the election, the instructions make clear that a failure to comply with the directions can 
result in the invalidation of a ballot. Under our long-standing practice, and consistent 
with the instructions and directions to the eligible voters, mail ballots received after the 
scheduled deadline are treated as void, and are not counted. 
In its exceptions, the Trust does not challenge the appropriateness of holding a 
mail-ballot election in the present case, the clarity of our written instructions to eligible 
voters, or the period of time under the schedule for the return of ballots to our post office 
box. Instead, it contends that the results of the election should be set aside because the 
ballots of three eligible voters, who aver that they mailed their ballots between five and 
seven days prior to the stipulated deadline, were not counted. It is undisputed that two 
of these ballots were received at our post office box after the expiration of the deadline, 
and one was never received. 
Among the inherent aspects of a mail-ballot election is the potential for eligible 
voters to fail to follow our instructions along with the potential for delayed delivery or the 
loss of ballots by the United States Postal Service. Nevertheless, our mail-ballot 
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j procedures and voting instructions help to minimize both potentialities through clear 
written instructions in the notice of election posted in the workplace well in advance of 
the scheduled count,2 and the equally clear written directions for the ballots to be mailed 
back as soon as possible. 
In support of its exceptions, the Trust relies upon Plainedge Union Free School 
District,3 where the Director set aside an election based upon a wholesale postal failure, 
as a result of which PERB received ballots from none of the seven eligible employees 
who comprised the unit. In that case, affidavits were submitted from each of the seven 
eligible voters stating that he or she had mailed a ballot back to PERB, thereby 
demonstrating that the non-receipt of the ballots was caused by a postal malfunction. 
In the present case, however, the Trust has not demonstrated a postal error or 
, malfunction that may warrant the relief it seeks. We received ballots from over 80% of 
the 16 eligible voters prior to the deadline expiration, and the return envelopes for the 
two late ballots were post-marked within a day or two of the expiration date. In light of 
our clear instructions and directions concerning the importance of the ballots being 
• received by April'15, 2010 at 9:30 a.m., together with the reasonable potential for postal 
delays, we are not persuaded by the Trust's argument that the election should be set 
aside. . 
In addition, the Trust argues in its brief that the Board should modify its practices 
2
 The importance we place in the timely posting of the notice of election is highlighted by 
our decision in South Huntington Union Free Sch Dist, 25 PERB p 0 6 9 (1992) to set 
aside an election due to a delay in the posting of the notice of election caused by PERB 
agents. 
J 3 18 PERB 1J4029 (1985).-
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by adopting the policy of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) of counting all 
ballots received prior to a vote count.4 In County of Oneida,5 we rejected an argument 
by an employee organization urging us to adopt an NLRB practice of automatically 
sending a replacement ballot to a unit employee who failed to sign the return envelope if 
the unsigned envelope was received before the due date for the return of the ballots. 
While private sector case law and procedures constitute persuasive authority, there are 
multiple differences in the NLRB's mail-balloting procedures, including the fact that 
ballots are returned to the NLRB Regional Director rather than a post office box. Such 
procedural differences are reflective of the distinct administrative experiences and the 
resources allocated for each agency. Finally, we are reluctant to adopt a post-hoc 
modification of one aspect of our mail-ballot procedure for the sole purpose of being 
consistent with the procedures of the NLRB or any other labor relations agency. The, 
voiding of ballots received at our post office box after the stipulated deadline, "is so 
longstanding that it would be inappropriate to alter it retroactively here."6 Any changes to 
our mail-ballot procedures should be considered only as part of a possible 
comprehensive agency reexamination of our election procedures. 
4
 Section 11336.5(c) of the NLRB's R-Casehandling Manual (II) states: 
Late or Unsigned Envelopes 
Ballots contained in envelopes received before the count should be counted, even if 
they are received after the close of business on the return date. Kerrville Bus Co. 
257 NLRB 176 (1981). Ballots that are returned in envelopes with no signatures or 
with names printed rather than signed should be voided. Thompson Roofing, inc, 
291 NLRB 742 (1988). 
5 29PERBP001 (1996). . 
6
 County of Washington, supra, note 1, 42 PERB 1J3021 at 3076. * 
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In County of Washington, we reaffirmed our policy of PERB agents challenging 
ballots received in unsigned envelopes. Such ballots will be counted, however, if the 
parties enter into a written agreement to waive the signature requirement. Regrettably, 
the PERB agent in the present case denied the parties the opportunity to agree that 
unsigned ballots will be counted despite our decision in County of Washington. 
Nevertheless, we affirm the Director's conclusion that the PERB agent's failure did not 
have an impact on the results of the election. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions by the Trust, affirm the 
decision of the Director, and dismiss the Trust's objections. . . ' 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York , 
rfJAJQlrt/ 
Jerome Lefkqwitz, Chairman 
/ Sheila S. Cofe, Member 
7
 Supra, note 1. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30052 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on a motion by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) for 
leave to file exceptions pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), to 
an interim determination by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director),1 pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, declining to process 
the allegations contained in a charge that the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District) violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by seeking to. terminate Grassel pursuant to 
1
 Although Grassel has labeled his pleading as exceptions, we are treating it as a 
motion for leave to file exceptions because it seeks interlocutory review of an 
interim determination by the Director. 
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Educ Law §3020-a, by refusing to comply with a court decision, by ostracizing him, 
and by failing to respond to his letter dated February 8, 2010. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In the past two years, the Board dismissed two prior charges filed by Grassel 
that alleged that the District violated §§209-a. 1(a) and (c) of the Act when it sought 
to discipline him pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a.2 In our most recent decision, we 
concluded that Grassel had failed to allege sufficient facts that, if proven, would 
create an inference that the December 17, 2007 disciplinary charges against him by 
the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. In the present charge, Grassel 
again alleges that the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by pursuing 
the December 17, 2007 disciplinary charges.. In addition, he alleges that the District 
was improperly motivated by refusing to comply with a court decision, by ostracizing 
him, and by failing to respond to his letter. 
!
 Following an initial review of Grassel's latest charge, the Director determined 
that the allegations made against the District should not be processed. In contrast, 
the Director processed Grassel's allegation thatthe United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 1, AFT, AFL-CIO violated §§209-a,2(a) and (c) of the Act by failing to respond 
to one of hia letters. 
2
 Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 
41 PERB U3024 (2008); Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB 1J3010 (2010). 
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DISCUSSION 
Leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions, 
pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules, will be granted only when a moving party 
demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.3 This high standard is predicated on 
"our recognition that it is more efficient to await a final disposition of the merits of 
a charge before we examine interim determinations. The improvident grant of 
leave can result in unnecessary delays in the processing of improper practice 
charges."4 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director performs an important 
administrative function for the agency by reviewing all newly filed charges to 
weed out facially deficient charges.5 
In the present case, following our review of Grassel's motion for leave to 
file exceptions, after granting all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
facts alleged in his charge against the District, we conclude that Grassel has 
failed to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting the 
grant of leave to file exceptions for purposes of reviewing the Director's interim 
3
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007); UFT (Grassel), 
32 PERB P071 (1999). 
4
 Board of Educ of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 
PERB U3031 at 3135 (2.008). 
5
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB P023 (2007). 
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determination pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules.6 
Based upon the foregoing, the motion by Grasselfor leave to file 
exceptions is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz/Gnairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
6
 Alternatively, if we were to grant Grassel's motion, we would dismiss his 
allegations against the District based upon the doctrine of res judicata with 
respect to the District's motivation in pursuing the December 17, 2007 charges, 
and based upon his failure to allege any facts that even remotely support his 
claim that the District was improperly motivated under the Act. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-30189 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
RONALD GRASSEL, prose 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on a motion by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) for 
leave to file exceptions pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules) to 
an interim determination by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director),1 pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, declining to process 
allegations contained in a charge alleging that the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) violated §§209-a.1(a), (c), (f) and 
(g) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by seeking to terminate 
Grassel pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a and by refusing to comply with a court 
decision. 
1
 Although Grassel has labeled his pleading as exceptions, we are treating it as a 
motion for leave to file exceptions because it seeks interlocutory review of an 
interim determination by the Director. 
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PRQCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is at least the fourth charge filed by Grassel alleging that the District is 
improperly motivated in seeking to discipline him pursuant to Educ Law §3020-a in 
violation.of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. In two prior decisions, we affirmed the 
dismissal of those claims on the merits.2 In our last decision on the merits, we 
found that Grassel's allegations, if true, were insufficient to establish an inference 
that the December 17, 2007 disciplinary charges issued against him were improperly 
motivated. In the present case, Grassel again alleges that the District violated 
§§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act by pursuing the same disciplinary charges. In 
addition, he alleges that the District was improperly motivated by refusing to,comply 
with a court decision with respect to those charges. 
Following an initial review of Grassel's charge, the Director determined that 
the allegations made against the District should not be processed. However, the 
Director processed Grassel's allegation that the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 1, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. by its alleged 
failure to respond to a letter. 
' DISCUSSION 
We will grant a motion for leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final 
rulings and decisions pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules, only when a moving 
party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.3 An "improvident grant of leave 
2
 Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 
41 PERB P024 (2008); Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB p o 10 (2010). 
3
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007); UFT (Grassel), 
32 PERB P071 (1999). 
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can result in unnecessary delays in the processing of improper practice 
charges."4 
Pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director is responsible for 
reviewing all newly filed charges to weed out facially deficient claims.5 This 
invaluable administrative function helps to ensure an efficient utilization of our 
agency's resources. In addition, the Director's determination not to process 
meritless claims prevents respondents from having to file pleadings and defend 
against such claims. 
Following our review of Grassel's motion for leave to file exceptions, and 
after granting all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts alleged in his 
charge against the District, we conclude that Grassel has failed to establish the 
existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of leave to file 
exceptions for purposes of reviewing the Director's interim determination 
pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules.6 
,
 4
 Board of Educ of the City School District of the City of New York (Grassel), 41 
PERBP031, at 3135 (2008). 
5
 See, MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
6
 Alternatively, if we were to grant Grassel's motion, we would dismiss his 
allegations against the District based upon the doctrine of res judicata with 
respect to the District's motivation in pursuing the December 17, 2007 charges, 
and based upon his failure to allege any new facts that even remotely support his 
) claim that the District was improperly motivated under the Act. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the motion by Grassel for leave to file 
exceptions is denied.7 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, (^airman 
s£A^ 
Sheila S. Cc5fe, Member 
7
 Pursuant to §2120) of the Rules, an individual may be suspended or disbarred 
from practicing before the Board when it is demonstrated after a hearing that he 
or she has engaged in aggravated misconduct. While we are sensitive to the fact 
that Grassel is unrepresented, and that neither the District nor UFT has made a 
motion seeking such sanctions under our Rules, the continued filings 'of 
redundant charges and vexatious motions by Grassel may constitute sufficient 
misconduct to form the basis for the imposition of appropriate sanctions in the 
future. See, In Re Halley, 30 PERB 1J3023 (1997). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
SHEEHAN, GREENE, CARRAWAY, GOLDERMAN & JACQUES, LLP 
(WILLIAM P. GOLDERMAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (CLAY J. 
LODOVICE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) (State) to a decision by the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director), on an improper 
practice charge filed by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), finding that the State violated §§209-a.1(a) and (g) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied a request by a 
NYSCOPBA unit probationary correction officer for representation during questioning by 
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a Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
investigator oh January 16, 2009 regarding the use of force by correction officers on an 
inmate at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility on December 26, 2008, and 
subsequently terminated the probationary correction officer on January 29, 2009.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
As part of its exceptions, the State asserts that the Assistant Director erred in 
concluding that it violated §§209-a.1(a) and (g) of the Act on the following grounds: 1) at 
the time of questioning, it did not reasonably appear that the probationary correction 
officer was a potential subject or target of disciplinary action because there were no 
pending allegations of wrongdoing against him; 2) it is irrelevant that NYSCOPBA 
representation was permitted, during the questioning of permanent correction officers by 
DOCS OIG during the same investigation; 3) the Assistant Director improperly placed 
the burden of proof on the State to demonstrate that the probationary correction officer 
was not the potential subject or target of disciplinary action at the time of questioning; 
and 4) the denial of representation during employer questioning of a public employee 
does not constitute a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. Finally, the State takes 
exception to the Assistant Director's proposed remedial order, including that portion of 
the order which directs the reinstatement of the probationary correction officer with back 
142PERB ^4545(2010). 
Case No. U-28910 3 
wages and benefits.2 
NYSCOPBA supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Direetor'sdecision and order in part, but reverse her 
finding that the State violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act, and modify the proposed remedial 
order. 
FACTS 
The State and NYSCOPBA are parties to an agreement containing a negotiated 
disciplinary procedure in lieu of Civ Serv Law §§.75 and 76, and a Bill of Rights granting 
unit members the right to NYSCOPBA representation during an interrogation if it is 
contemplated that the employee may be served with a notice of discipline under the 
disciplinary procedure. Neither party claims that the agreement provides probationary 
employees in the NYSCOPBA unit with a contract-based entitlement to representation 
during DOCS questioning. 
2
 The State's exceptions also repeat a number of legal arguments that we recently 
rejected in State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 43 PERB1J3031 
(2010): a) probationary employees are not covered by §209-a.1(g) of the Act; b) the 
purpose of §209-a.1(g) of the Act is to grant representational rights only to those 
employees who are subject to Civ Serv Law §75 disciplinary procedures or who are 
subject to disciplinary procedures under a collectively negotiated agreement; and c) an 
interpretation of §209-a.1(g) of the Act that recognizes representational rights of 
probationary employees is an impairment of the State's contractual rights in violation of 
Article .1 ,'§10 of the United States Constitution. In light of our prior decision, we need not 
reiterate our reasoning for rejecting those legal arguments. 
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On January 28, 2008, Wayne Sheridan (Sheridan) was hired as a DOCS 
correction officer. While working at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility on 
December 26, 2008, and while still in probationary status, Sheridan responded to a call 
about a confrontation taking place at the facility involving the use of force by correction 
officers to subdue an inmate. Upon arriving at the scene, Sheridan observed fellow 
officers on the floor struggling with the inmate. Sheridan assisted in restraining the 
inmate, who was face down and kicking, by holding down his ankles for approximately 
15 seconds until the inmate was placed in handcuffs by another officer. It is undisputed 
that five officers, including Sheridan, were involved in this use of force incident.3 
Immediately following the incident, Sheridan and the other officers were directed 
to prepare memoranda about what had occurred.4 In addition, an investigation was 
commenced by DOCS OIG regarding the incident because, as a DOCS OIG 
investigator testified, "it was obvious that this was a major incident and something major 
had occurred that was not reported."5 As part of the investigation, DOCS OIG obtained 
photographs and medical records, which led DOCS to conclude that the inmate had 
sustained injuries, including baton strikes to his left arm, thigh and his left knee during 
the incident.6 It also obtained photographs of certain officers who worked at the facility. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 100-101 
4
 Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 19, 27-29; Joint Exhibit 5. 
5
 Transcript, p. 89. l 
^Transcript, p. 89; Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 17, 21-23 
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A total of 18 correction officers, including Sheridan and four other officers directly 
involved in the incident, were questioned by DOCS OIG at its offices on the W. A. 
Harriman State Office Campus (State Office Campus). With the exception of Sheridan, 
all of the correction officers were permitted NYSCOPBA representation during 
questioning.7 
Pursuant to a DOCS memorandum dated January 15, 2009, Sheridan's 
probationary period was extended until February 9, 2009.8 It is undisputed that the 
extension was directly related to the investigation into the use of force incident.9 
In response to an order, Sheridan appeared for questioning by a DOCS OIG 
investigator on January 16, 2009 at DOCS' offices on the State Office Campus. Prior to 
the questioning, a NYSCOPBA attorney informed the DOCS Deputy Inspector General 
that Sheridan wanted representation, and that both Sheridan and the attorney believed 
that Sheridan was a target of the investigation and a potential subject of discipline. The 
Deputy Inspector General denied the representation request stating that, as a matter of 
DOCS policy, a probationary employee is not entitled to representation during 
questioning. In addition, he told the NYSCOBPA attorney that DOCS had not made a 
determination as to whether "Sheridan was a target of the investigation."10 Thereafter, 
7
 Transcript, pp. 94-96, 98. 
8
 Charging Party Exhibit 3. 
9
 Transcript, pp. 129-130. 
10
 Joint Exhibit 2. In contrast, a NYSCOPBA shop steward testified that he was told that 
Sheridan "wasn't a target." Transcript, p. 45. 
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the questioning of Sheridan commenced before a stenographer, without the presence of 
a NYSCOPBA representative. 
After Sheridan was placed under oath and given a copy of DOCS Directive No. 
0102, entitled Rights of Departmental Employees, which sets forth the rights of DOCS 
employees during an investigation, Sheridan requested NYSCOPBA representation, 
which was denied.11 The DOCS OIG investigator told Sheridan that the questioning was 
part of an official investigation into the use offeree incident, and that he was obligated 
to answer each question. In addition, he was told that "[a]t this time" he was not the 
target of the investigation or a target of discipline but that if he admitted to misconduct 
or wrongdoing during the questioning or was not "completely honest", he may be 
terminated.12 • . ' , 
During the questioning, Sheridan was asked to describe his physical contact with 
the inmate during the incident. In response to specific questions, Sheridan denied that 
he had assaulted, kicked, punched or struck the inmate with a'baton or was responsible 
for injuries that appeared in photographs shown to him.13 At various points during the. 
11
 The stenographic transcript of the questioning, and the DOCS Directive are in the 
record. Joint Exhibit 4; Respondent Exhibit 2. Even after the enactment of §209-a.1(g) 
of the Act in 2007, the DOCS Directive references only non-criminal investigatory 
procedures under Civ Serv Law §75 or a negotiated agreement. Respondent Exhibit 2, 
II.B. 
12
 Joint Exhibit 4, pp. 2-3. During his testimony before the Assistant Director, the DOCS 
OIG investigator testified that other than Sheridan's statements in his memorandum, 
"[fjhere was no other allegations against Mr. Sheridan or anything at that point." 
Transcript, p. 88. • . 
13
 Joint Exhibit, pp. 21,25-26. 
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questioning, Sheridan stated that he was unable to identify the officers or the inmate 
involved because they were not facing him during his short presence at the incident. In 
addition, he denied observing the inmate being injured or the presence of blood on the 
floor. 
On January 20, 2009, DOCS OIG sent a memorandum to DOCS' Director of 
Human Resources Daniel Martuscello, III (Martuscello) stating that Sheridan was not 
forthcoming during questioning because he denied observing the use of force by other 
correction officers during the incident.14 Two days later, Sheridan was terminated from 
his probationary position because of a "lack of specificity" in his answers to the 
questions about what occurred during the incident.15 In addition, Martuscello testified 
that the termination was based upon a concern that Sheridan's answers demonstrated 
an inability to be a credible witness regarding inmate misconduct in a correctional 
environment.16 Subsequent to Sheridan's termination, DOCS justified its adverse action 
based upon its conclusion that he was not forthcoming and truthful during the 
questioning.17 , 
Respondent Exhibit 7. 
15
 Transcript, pp. 120, 132. Similarly, the DOCS OIG investigator testified that he was 
concerned about Sheridan's lack of specificity about what took place during the incident. 
Transcript, pp. 89-90. 
16
 Transcript, pp. 120-121. 
17
 Transcript, pp. 67, 72; Respondent Exhibit 4. 
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DISCUSSION 
In State of New York (Department of Correctional Services),™ we set forth the 
applicable standards under §209-a. 1 (g) of the Act for determining whether, at the time 
of questioning, it reasonably appeared that an employee was the potential subject or 
target of disciplinary action: 
In determining this question, we consider the totality 
of the circumstances including the reasonableness of 
the employee's subjective perception, which may 
have precipitated the request for representation. 
Although an employee's perceptions are relevant to 
our inquiry, our primary focus is on objective facts in 
the record. Those facts include: the subject matter 
and context of the questioning; the verbal and written 
statements by the employer prior to the questioning; 
the verbal exchange between the employer
 r 
representative and the employee; the timing and 
venue of the questioning; and the treatment of other-
employees similarly situated.19 
Based upon the totality of the circumstances in the present case, we conclude 
that the State violated §209-a. 1 (g) of the Act by denying Sheridan's request for 
NYSCOPBA representation during the questioning on January 16, 2009. The evidence 
establishes that NYSCOPBA and Sheridan reasonably believed that he was a potential 
subject or target of discipline, and therefore, they requested DOCS to permit him to be 
represented by a NYSCOPBA representative during the questioning. 
18
 Supra, note 2. 
19
 43 PERB 1J3031, at 3121. 
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Additional objective evidence in the record further demonstrates that it 
reasonably appeared at the time of questioning that Sheridan was a potential subject or 
target of discipline. The written recommendation seeking Sheridan's termination, dated 
January 21, 2009, states that at the time of questioning he was "under official 
investigation."20 Furthermore, the questioning took place in the context of a DOCS 
investigation into a major incident at a correctional facility involving the use offeree by 
correction officers, which DOCS believed resulted in substantial physical injuries to an 
inmate, and was not reported by the correction officers involved. It is undisputed that 
Sheridan was one of the five correction officers who utilized force during the incident, , 
and he filed a report that did not mention the use offeree by the other correction officers 
or the inmate's injuries. 
During the questioning by the DOCS OIG investigator, Sheridan was told that he 
was not the target of the investigation or a target of discipline "at this time," but that his 
answers may result in his termination. This verbal exchange between the DOCS OIG 
investigator and Sheridan demonstrates that he was a potential subject or target of 
discipline. The facts that Sheridan may not have been a current target of the 
investigation, and there were no pending allegations of wrongdoing against him, do not 
negate the potential that he may become a subject or target of discipline based upon 
the substance of his responses to questions concerning his conduct during and after the 
incident. Indeed, Sheridan was specifically questioned about his own use offeree on 
20
 Respondent Exhibit 5. 
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the inmate, and whether his conduct caused the injuries displayed in the photographs. 
Furthermore, Sheridan was questioned about the use of force by other officers, which 
was not reported in his memorandum following the incident. 
The context and manner of the questioning provide further support for our 
conclusion that Sheridan was a potential subject or target of discipline. Sheridan was 
questioned under oath, before a stenographer, and at DOCS OIG's offices on the State 
Office Campus where interrogations are generally conducted. During the questioning, 
Sheridan was given a copy of a DOCS Directive outlining the rights of employees during 
departmental investigations including the right of representation during an interrogation. 
We reject the State's exception to the Assistant Director's reliance on the fact 
that other unit members were permitted NYSCOPBA representation during the 
investigation. In State of New York (Department of Correctional Services),2^ we 
concluded that the fact that other unit employees were permitted representation during 
investigatory questioning is relevant to whether another employee questioned over the 
same incident was a potential subject or target of discipline. In the present case, DOCS 
permitted 17 other correction officers to be represented by NYSCOPBA during 
questioning, all of whom had a contractual right to such representation when DOCS 
contemplated serving a notice of discipline under the parties' agreement. 
We find nothing in the record.or the Assistant Director's decision to support the 
State's argument that the Assistant Director improperly placed the burden of proof on 
21
 Supra, note 2. . " 
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the State to demonstrate that Sheridan was not the subject or target of potential 
disciplinary action at the time of questioning. NYSCOPBA had the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of evidence the elements necessary to demonstrate a violation of 
§209-a. 1 (g) of the Act. The fact that the Assistant Director was not persuaded by the 
State's evidence does not constitute a misapplication of the burden of proof. 
We next turn to the State's exception challenging the Assistant Director's 
conclusion that it violated §209-a.1(a)of the Act. In State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services),22 we held that the denial of representation during investigatory 
questioning by an employer does not constitute a violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act.23 
As a result, we reverse the Assistant Director's finding that the State violated §209-
a.1 (a) of the Act when it denied such representation to Sheridan. 
Finally, we consider the State's exception challenging the Assistant Director's. 
proposed remedial order. Specifically, it objects to that portion of the proposed remedial 
order directing the reinstatement of Sheridan with back wages and benefits based upon 
the denial of NYSCOPBA representation during the January 16, 2009 questioning.24 
22
 Supra, note 2. ) 
23
 Our conclusion was based upon the Legislature's decision to not amend §202 of the 
Act following the decision in NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 8 NY3d 226, 
40 PERB H7001 (2007). 
24
 In its brief, the State contends that NYSCOPBA failed to adequately plead that 
Sheridan's termination resulted from the denial of representation during the questioning. 
This argument, however, is without merit because the charge can reasonably be 
interpreted to allege a causal connection between Sheridan's termination and the denial 
of representation. ALJ Exhibit 1, Details'of Charge, H1J6-13, 19. 
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The purpose of our remedial orders "is to make parties whole for the wrong 
sustained by placing them as nearly as possible in the position they would have been in 
had the improper practice not been committed."25 In enacting §209-a.1(g) of the Act, 
the Legislature did not modify PERB's authority, pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, to 
order "an offending party to cease and desist from any improper practice, and to take 
such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this article (but not to assess 
exemplary damages), including but not limited to the reinstatement of employees with or 
without back pay." 
The Legislature's decision to grant PERB the authority to apply its full improper 
practice remedial powers to violations of §209-a.1(g) of the Act constitutes a public 
policy determination that our agency should have greater powers to remedy the denial 
of representation during employer questioning than that granted to the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).26 In contrast 
to our remedial authority under §205.5(d) of the Act, the powers of the NLRB are 
expressly restrained in cases when an employee was terminated for cause pursuant to 
25
 Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066, at 3139 (1992). See also, 
City of Oneonta, 43 PERB 1J3006 (2010). It has been long settled that the "remedies for 
improper employer practices are peculiarly matters within [PERB's] administrative 
competence." City of Albany v Helsby, 29 NY2d 433, 439, 5 PERB 1J7000, at 7003 
(1972). 
29 USC §§151-169. 
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§ 10(c) of the NLRA/V 
Prior to the enactment of §209-a.1 (g) of the Act, the Board regularly ordered 
make-whole relief, including reinstatement with back wages and benefits, when an 
employer's improper practice resulted in the termination of an employee, including a 
probationary employee, because such remedies are consistent with the policies of the 
Act.28 Contrary to the State's argument, our remedial orders requiring reinstatement 
and other make-whole relief for employees harmed by an improper practice are not 
limited to cases involving improper employer motivation under the Act.29 
Although we have declined to order reinstatement with back wages in the two 
cases cited by the State, both .cases are limited to their particular facts involving criminal 
behavior by employees, and are inapplicable to the present case. In City of Olean;30 we 
declined to remedy an employer's improperly motivated adverse action with an order of 
27
 29 USC §160(c) states, in part: "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement 
of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the 
payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for 
cause." Seejaracorp Inc, 273 NLRB 221(1984) overruling Kraft Foods, 251 NLRB 598 
(1980). 
28
 Sag Harbor Union Free Sch Dist, 8 PERB 1J3077 (1975), confirmed Sag Harbor.Union 
Free Sch Dist, 54 AD2d 391, 9 PERB 1J7023 (3d Dept 1976); City of Buffalo (Police 
Department), 20 PERB 1J3048 (1987); Mahopac Cent Sch Dist, 28 PERB 1J3045 (1995); 
County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 1J3042 (2001). 
29
 See, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 1J3005 (2008), confirmed'sub nom. 
and mod, in part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
61 AD3d 1231, 42' PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009); 
Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent Sch Dist, supra note 21; Mahopac Cent Sch Dist, supra, 
note 28. 
30
 2 PERB 1J3069 (1969). 
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reinstatement because the evidence established the employee had failed to disclose his 
record of felony convictions on his employment application, and the employer had a 
policy of not hiring or retaining employees with a felony conviction.31 Similarly, in 
Croton-Harmon Union Free School District,32 we applied our discretion by not ordering 
reinstatement where a Civ Sery Law §75 hearing officer had previously found that the 
employees had engaged in intentional theft of overtime compensation, and the evidence 
in the PERB record established that employer's discovery of the theft was independent 
of the unlawfully motivated investigation.33 
In contrast to those cases, the present case does not involve proven criminal 
activity, but rather a termination resulting from dissatisfaction by the State with the 
answers given by an employee during questioning conducted in violation of §209-a.1(g) 
of the Act. Among the reasons for requiring employee organizational representation 
during employer questioning is that a representative can aid in the search for the truth 
31
 We note that our decision in City of Olean was consistent with the general civil • 
service principle, set forth in Civ Serv Law §50.4, permitting the revocation of an 
appointment upon a finding of an illegality, irregularity or fraud of a substantial nature in 
a civil service application. 
32
 31 PERB U3086 (1998), pet dismissed 32 PERB 1J7010 (Sup Ct Albany County 
1999). 
33
 Since Croton-Harmon Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 31, the Legislature amended 
§205.5(d) of the Act to preclude the grant of deference to findings of fact and law.made 
by a Civ Serv Law §75 hearing officer. L 2001, c 389. 
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and, at the same time, protect the employee's rights. As the United States Supreme 
Court stated in NLRB vJ Weingarten, Inc: 
A single employee confronted by an employer 
investigating whether certain conduct deserves 
discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate 
accurately the incident being investigated, or too 
ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A 
knowledgeable union representative could assist the 
employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the 
employer production time by getting to the bottom of 
the incident occasioning the interview.35 
Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, we conclude that a 
remedial order directing the reinstatement of Sheridan to his probationary position with 
back wages and benefits is consistent with the policies of the Act. The evidence 
demonstrates a direct relationship between the denial of representation and Sheridan's 
termination, which was based upon the State's perception that his answers were 
incomplete or untruthful. NYSCOPBA representation during the DOCS OIG questioning 
may have diminished the basis for this perception by the representative rephrasing, 
clarifying or supplementing the questions asked, and by providing Sheridan with advice 
during the course of the questioning. In reaching our conclusion today, we note that 
DOCS did not offer any objective evidence demonstrating that Sheridan's answers 
under oath constituted perjury. 
34
 See, Governor Spitzer's Approval Memorandum No. 10, L 2007, c 244, Bill Jacket, p. 
3. 
35
 420 US 251, 262-263 (1975). 
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In order to return Sheridan to the status quo ante, we modify the Assistant 
Director's proposed remedial order to make clear that upon his reinstatement, Sheridan 
will be returned to his probationary status at the time of the termination.36 
Nothing in this decision shall prohibit the State, following Sheridan's 
reinstatement, from conducting another interrogation regarding the December 26, 2008 
use of force incident so long as, upon request, he is permitted to have NYSCOPBA 
representation during such questioning, and the State does not utilize any information, 
documents or the transcript resulting from the January 16, 2009 interrogation. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision finding that 
the State violated §209-a. 1(g) of the Act, reverse the finding that it violated §209-a.1(a) 
of the Act, and modify the recommended remedial order. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State: 
1. forthwith offer Sheridan reinstatement to his former probationary . 
correction officer position, and make him whole for any wages and benefits lost from his 
termination to the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, with interest at the 
maximum legal rate; v 
2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State 
regarding the January 16, 2009 questioning of Sheridan, including the transcript of the 
January 16, 2009 interrogation, the January 20, 2009 memorandum to Martuscello, the 
written recommendation seeking Sheridan's termination dated January 21, 2009, and 
36
 See, Pastore v City of Troy, 152 AD2d 808 (3d Dept 1989). . 
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v. 
any other documents in DOCS personnel records, correction officer Sheridan's 
personnel history folder, and in DOCS OIG's investigatory notes, memoranda, email, 
and reports, relating to the questioning of Sheridan without representation; 
3. reconsider Sheridan's probationary status without reference to the content 
of the January 16, 2009 questioning; 
4. not use any information received from Sheridan during the January 16, 
2009 questioning, and 
5. sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
t J ~"JJUrYt%A— Jerome LefKowitz/jChairman 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services) in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. that the State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services) will forthwith: 
1. forthwith offer Sheridan reinstatement to his former probationary correction officer 
position, and make him whole for any wages and benefits lost from his termination to the 
effective date of the offer of reinstatement, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State regarding the 
January 16, 2009 questioning of Sheridan, including the transcript of the January 16, 2009 
interrogation, the January 20, 2009 memorandum to Martuscello, the written recommendation 
seeking Sheridan's termination dated January 21, 2009, and any other documents in DOCS 
personnel records, correction officer Sheridan's personnel history folder, and in DOCS OIG's 
investigatory notes, memoranda, email, and reports, relating to the questioning of Sheridan 
without representation; 
3. reconsider Sheridan's probationary status without reference to the content of the 
January 16, 2009 questioning;; and 
4. not use any information received from Sheridan during the January 16, 2009 
questioning. 
Dated . . . . . . . . By . . 
on behalf of State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
V STATE OF NEW YORK 
/ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 




STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
SHEEHAN, GREENE, CARRAWAY, GOLDERMAN & JACQUES, LLP 
(WILLIAM P. GOLDERMAN of counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (CLAY J. 
J LODOVICE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a motion by the State of New York (Department 
of Correctional Services) (State) seeking an order to reconsider and annul a portion of 
our remedial order, dated September 21, 2010, regarding its violation of §209-a. 1(g) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by denying representation to a 
probationary correction officer represented by the New York State Correctional Officers 
and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) during questioning by a 
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
investigator. Specifically, the State seeks reconsideration and annulment of the first 
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paragraph of the remedial order in our earlier decision.1 NYSCOPBA opposes the 
motion. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
During the hearing before the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director), the State presented evidence demonstrating 
that its denial of NYSCOPBA representation to the probationary correction officerin the 
present case was based upon an employer policy of denying such representation 
despite the Legislature's enactment of §209-a. 1(g) of the Act. In addition, it is 
undisputed that on the date of the questioning the DOCS OIG investigator was unaware 
that the Act had been amended to guarantee to all public employees covered by the Act 
the right, upon request, to employee organization representation during employer 
questioning when it reasonably appears that the employee may be the subject or target 
of potential disciplinary action. 
In her proposed remedial order, the Assistant Director directed, inter alia, that the 
State: \ 
1. allow probationary unit employees NYSCOPBA 
representation, at the their request, when they are 
questioned by the Stateand at the time of questioning 
it reasonably appears that they may be the subjects of 
potential disciplinary action; 
2. immediatey remove and destroy all documents 
maintained in DOCS' files, including corrections 
officer Chagnon's personnel file, relating to the portion 
of the interview conducted without corrections officer 
Chagnon's NYSCOPBA representative present, 
1
 State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 43 PERB H3031 at 3123 
(2010). 
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including the parts of the report of investigator Nocera 
relating to said portion.2 
Although the State objected generally to the Assistant Director's proposed 
remedial order, its exceptions were primarily focused on the second paragraph of the 
order. Its exception to the remedial order stated: 
Furthermore, the ALJ erred in creating an 
overly expansive remedy set forth in #2 as the 
remedy, even assuming a violation, should be 
limited to prohibiting the use of the January 28, 
2008 statement against CO. Chagnon. 
The State did not, however, claim that the first paragraph of the proposed remedial 
order was overly expansive or inconsistent with our precedent. Following our 
examination of the record, we concluded that the breadth of the proposed order was 
appropriate because the State's violation was premised not merely on a single fact-
based denial of such representation but on its across-the-board policy of denying 
employee organization representation during questioning of probationary employees. 
Nevertheless, we modified the wording of the first paragraph of the order to be 
consistent with the wording of §209-a.1 (g) of the Act. 
DISCUSSION 
Our Rules of Procedure (Rules) do not expressly include a procedure permitting 
the filing of a motion to the Board for reconsideration of a final decision and order. 
Section 213 of the Act provides that a party aggrieved from a final Board decision and 
order may seek judicial review by filing a "petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 within 30 
days after receipt of the Board's decision and order. In the present case, the State has 
2
 42 PERB 1J4552, at 4711 (2009). 
Case No. U-28160 - 4 -
not sought judicial review of our decision and order. Instead, it seeks reconsideration 
and an annulment of a portion of our remedial order. 
Nevertheless, under certain unique facts and circumstances, the Board will 
entertain a motion to reconsider a final decision and order. However, such 
reconsideration does not extend the statute of limitations set forth in §213 of the Act.. 
In Northport/East Northport Union Free School District, et a/.,3 we reiterated that: 
A motion to an administrative agency for a 
reconsideration of its final administrative action 
is an unusual procedure. Such motions are 
properly entertained only if there is newly 
discovered evidence or the agency has 
overlooked or misapprehended relevant facts or 
that it has misapplied a controlling principle of 
law.4 (footnotes omitted) 
In its exceptions, the State did not claim that the Assistant Director's proposed 
order requiring it to permit NYSCOPBA representation during questioning of 
probationary unit employees was overbroad or inconsistent with prior precedent.. 
Therefore, pursuant to §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules and our precedent, the State arguably 
waived the argument it now asserts.5 
3
 27 PERB H3061(1994) 
4
 Supra, note 3, 27 PERB 1J3061, at 3141. See also UFT (Freedman), 34 PERB 1J3005 
(2001); Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB 1J3010 (1986); Auburn Police Local 195, Council 
82, AFSCME, 10 PERB H3060 (1977); Binghamton Firefighters, Local 729, IAFF, AFL-
CIO, 9 PERB TJ3078 (1976). 
5
 See, Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), confirmed, Town of Orangetown v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007); 
County of Monroe, 43 PERB H3025, n.6 (2010). 
Case No. U-28160 - 5 -
However, "under §205.5(d) of the Act, it is our right and obligation upon finding 
an improper practice to have been committed to order such remedial relief as will 
effectuate the policies of the Act and it is that principle which both guides and limits our 
remedial determination."6 In the application of our remedial powers, we are not limited 
by a remedy proposed by a charging party.7 In the present case, it is undisputed that 
the State's denial of NYSCOPBA representation stemmed from a policy of denying such 
representation to probationary employees rather than a mere misapplication of the right 
guaranteed by §209-a.1 (g) of the Act to a particular employee. In light of this fact the 
first paragraph of our order was aimed at ensuring that the State would change its 
policy. To avoid any confusion with respect to the purpose and scope of our prior order, 
we have clarified it accordingly. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State: 
1. modify its across-the-board policy of not permitting NYSCOPBA representation 
during questioning of DOCS probationary employees consistent with the 
provisions of §209-a.1 (g) of the Act; 
2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, 
including documents in DOCS personnel records, correction officer Jason 
Chagnon's personnel history folder, and in DOCS OIG's investigatory notes, 
memoranda, email, and reports, which may contain information that was 
6
 City of Troy, 28 PERB 1J3027, at 3064 (1995). 
7
 County of Columbia, 41 PERB.1J3023 (2008). 
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obtained during the January 28, 2008 questioning of Chagnon without 
representation; 
3. reconsider the March 22, 2008 counseling of correction officer Jason Chagnon 
without regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 
. questioning of Chagnon without representation; 
4. reconsider the placement of correction officer Jason Chagnon on 
administrative leave with pay without regard to the information obtained during 
the January 28, 2008 questioning without representation, and, if appropriate, 
modify his date of permanent appointment; and 
5. sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 ' 
Albany, New York . 
// Jerome Lefl#6witz£^hairman 
Sheila S. Col£, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) that the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
will: 
1. modify its across-the-board policy of not permitting NYSCOPBA representation during 
questioning of DOCS probationary employees consistent with the provisions of §209-
a. 1(g) of the Act; 
2. immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, including 
documents in DOCS personnel records, correction officer Jason Chagnon's personnel 
history folder, and in DOC OIG's investigatory notes, memoranda, email, and reports, 
which may contain information that was obtained during the January 28, 2008 
questioning of Chagnon without representation; 
3. reconsider the March 22, 2008 counseling of correction officer Jason Chagnon without 
regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 questioning of 
Chagnon without representation; and 
4. reconsider the placement of correction officer Jason Chagnon on administrative leave 
with pay without regard to the information obtained during the January 28, 2008 
questioning without representation, and, if appropriate, modify his date of permanent 
appointment. 
Dated By 
on behalf of 
State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not 
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 860, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27599 
- and-
YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
YONKERS COUNCIL OF ADMINISTRATORS, 
LOCAL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF SCHOOL 
ADMINISTRATORS, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (ANN M. BURDICKof counsel), 
for Charging Party 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER AND DROHAN (LAWRENCE W. 
THOMAS of counsel), for Respondent 
BRUCE K. BRYANT, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Yonkers City School 
District (District) and the Yonkers Council of Administrators, Local 8, American 
Federation of School Administrators, AFL-CIO (Council) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by the Yonkers 
Federation of Teachers, Local 860, AFL-CIO (Federation) alleging that the District 
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violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally transferred the duties of the International Baccalaureate (IB) program 
developer at the Casimir Pulaski School (Pulaski School) to a nonunit administrator. 
The District filed an answer denying the allegations of the charge. In its answer, the 
Council denied having knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief about 
several of the allegations. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ concluded that the District's unilateral transfer of 
the IB developer duties violated the Act.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that the IB 
program developer duties were performed exclusively by Federation unit employees at 
the Pulaski School. In addition, it contends that the tasks assigned to the nonunit 
administrator were not substantially similar to the IB program developer duties 
performed by unit employees. The Council excepts to the ALJ's findings on the same 
grounds, and it asserts that the District substantially changed the qualifications for the 
IB developer position when it assigned the position's duties to a nonunit administrator. 
The Federation supports the ALJ's determination. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The Federation is the exclusive bargaining representative for teachers in the 
1
 42 PERB .114557(2009). 
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District. The Council is the exclusive bargaining representative for District principals 
and assistant principals. 
The International Baccalaureate (IB) is a multicultural educational program 
based in Switzerland. The IB program is offered at four District schools: Yonkers High 
School, Yonkers Middle School, the Rosemary Siragusa (Siragusa) School, and the 
Pulaski School. At the Pulaski and Siragusa Schools, the IB program is offered for 
students in kindergarten through grade five. 
There is an IB program developer in each school. An IB program developer is 
responsible for administering the program in her or his assigned school, and the 
position's duties are the same at each school.2 These duties include distributing IB 
program developments to teachers and administrators in their school, organizing and 
attending training events and workshops for teachers to learn how to integrate the IB 
philosophy into their lesson plans, and meeting with teachers in congruence sessions in 
their school. At the congruence sessions, the IB program developer supports and 
offers suggestions to teachers on how to promote the IB philosophy in their lesson 
plans and classroom activities. In addition, IB program developers communicate with 
other IB program developers in the District and with staff at the IB international office in 
Switzerland. If the IB program has been implemented at a school but it has not yet 
been certified by the IB international office, then the IB program developer prepares 
and submits the three-part certification application for the approval of the IB 
2
 The title of the IB program developer position varies from school to school in the 
District, but the duties are the same regardless of title. 
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international office. 
It is undisputed that Federation unit employees have exclusively performed IB 
developer duties at the Yonkers High School, Yonkers Middle School, and the Siragusa 
School. 
In September 2004, the IB program was implemented at the Pulaski School. 
Marian Gildard (Gildard), a Federation unit employee, was the IB program developer at 
that school from September 2004 until January 2005, when she left for maternity leave. 
Mary Ellen Ryan (Ryan), a reading teacher and a Federation unit employee, performed 
IB developer duties after Gildard left in January 2005.3 Leila Faour (Faour), a substitute 
teacher and Federation unit employee, was the IB program developer for the 2005-
2006 school year. At the start of the 2006-2007 school year, there was no IB program 
developer at the Pulaski School. As a result of the vacancy, Marlene Feder (Feder), IB 
program developer at the Siragusa School since 2001 and Federation unit employee, 
performed IB program developer duties at the Pulaski School in addition to her duties at 
the Siragusa School from September 2006 until November 2006. The IB developer-
position was vacant, and Feder testified that its duties were not performed at the 
Pulaski School from November 2006 until January 2007. 
As principal of the Pulaski School, Steven Murphy (Murphy) has supervisory 
responsibilities over the implementation of the IB philosophy at the school. When 
Murphy was hired in August 2006, two parts of the three-part application for certification 
3
 The record does not indicate when Ryan ceased to perform IB program developer 
duties. 
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had been submitted, and the school was preparing for the third part of the application, a 
visit by the IB certification team in November 2006. Murphy reviewed the school's 
application, noted that the IB program developer position was vacant, and contacted 
Feder for guidance on how to prepare for the visit by the IB certification team. The IB 
certification team visited and determined that certification of the school would be 
postponed because the IB program developer position was vacant. 
Murphy attended an IB training in December 2006, and learned that in other 
school districts, IB program developer duties are performed by administrators. He also 
i 
learned that accountability was critical to the functioning of the IB program. In January 
2007, Murphy met with the District superintendent and other District officials to discuss 
hiring an assistant principal who would also coordinate and be accountable for the 
functioning of the IB program. 
On January 17, 2007, thefJistrict hired Jelia Honeywell (Honeywell) to be 
assistant principal at the Pulaski School. Among the duties that were assigned to 
Honeywell were the IB program developer duties previously performed by Federation 
unit employees. Honeywell supervises and evaluates teachers and their teaching 
methods at the weekly congruence meetings, and she writes up the evaluations and 
submits them to the District. In addition, she has attended IB training sessions, she 
coordinates training for teachers at IB workshops and conferences, and she attends 
congruence meetings with teachers where she offers suggestions and help to teachers 
on how to promote the IB philosophy in their lesson plans. 
Case No. U-27599 6 
DISCUSSION 
The inquiry as to whether a transfer of unit work violates §209-a.1 (d) of the Act 
centers around the resolution of two essential questions: 1) was the work at issue 
exclusively performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to have become 
binding; and 2) was the work assigned to nonunit personnel substantially similar to that 
exclusive unit work.4 We will find a violation if both of these questions are answered in 
the affirmative unless there has been a significant change in job qualifications or there 
has been a curtailment in the level of services.5 In such cases, we will balance the 
respective interests of the public employer and the unit employees, both individually 
and collectively, to determine whether there has been a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act.6 
A. Exclusivity 
We begin with the District's and Council's exception to the ALJ's finding that the 
IB program developer duties were performed exclusively by Federation unit employees. 
The District and the Council assert that because Faour was a per diem substitute 
teacher when she performed IB duties at the Pulaski School from 2005 to 2006, and 
because Murphy, the Pulaski School principal, performed IB-related duties in the fall of 
2006, the Federation lacks exclusivity. The District and Council also assert that the IB 
4
 Town of Riverhead, 42 PERB 1J3032 (2009), County of Westchester, 42 PERB P025 
(2009); Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl3005 (2008), (subsequent history • 
omitted); Niagara Frontier Transp Auth, 18 PERB 113083 (1985). 
5
 Supra note 4. 
6
 Id. • 
Case No. U-27599 7 
program developer duties are not exclusive to the Federation because they are 
inherently administrative in nature. 
In determining the exclusivity of bargaining unit work, we will apply the past 
practice analysis restated in Chenango Forks Central School District7 whether the 
"practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time under 
the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit 
employees that the [practice] would continue."8 
In this case, the record supports the ALJ's finding that the duties of the IB 
program developer at the Pulaski School and at the other IB schools in the District have 
been exclusively performed by teachers in the Federation bargaining unit. Federation 
employees continuously performed IB program developer duties at the Pulaski School 
from September 2004 until November 2006. The Federation unit had exclusivity over 
the work during this period because only unit employees performed IB program 
developer duties, and the'performance of such work was unequivocal and 
uninterrupted. This created a reasonable expectation that the duties of IB program 
developer position at the Pulaski School would continue to be performed by Federation 
employees. In addition, no one from outside the unit performed the at-issue duties prior 
to the assignment of those duties to Honeywell in January 2007. 
We find no merit to the District's and Council's assertion of non-exclusivity 
because Faour was a per diem substitute at the time she performed IB program 
7
 40 PERB P012 (2007) (subsequent history omitted). 
8
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, supra, note 7, at 3046-47. 
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developer duties at the Pulaski School. Regular substitute teachers and per diem 
appointments are included in the Federation bargaining unit pursuant to the recognition 
clause of the collectively negotiated agreement between the District and the Federation. 
• Therefore, Faour's performance of IB program developer duties does not defeat 
exclusivity. 
The record does not support the District's and Council's assertion that Murphy 
performed IB program developer duties in the fall 2006. Murphy testified that he 
attended a single IB training session from August 2006 to January 2007, and the 
evidence establishes that his attendance was part of his general supervisory.duties. As 
principal, he was responsible for overseeing the entire IB program and ensuring that the 
IB philosophy was implemented. There is nothing in the record demonstrating that 
Murphy performed IB program developer duties such as sharing IB developments with 
teachers or other administrators, or meeting with teachers in congruence meetings to 
collaborate on lesson plans and activities. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's determination 
that IB program developer duties were performed exclusively by Federation employees. 
The District's and Council's argument that the IB program developer duties are 
non-exclusive because the duties are inherently administrative in nature is without 
merit. The issue presented in this charge is whether the at-issue work has been 
exclusively performed by Federation unit employees, and not whether the IB program 
developer belongs in the Federation unit. The latter issue could only be determined as 
. part of a representation proceeding. The record clearly demonstrates that IB program 
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developer duties were performed exclusively by the Federation employees at the 
Pulaski School. 
B. Sufficient Similarity in Duties Performed 
We next address the District's and the Council's exception to the ALJ's finding 
that the tasks that were assigned to Honeywell were substantially similar to the duties 
performed by Federation employees. The District and the Council argue that 
Honeywell's duties as assistant principal are sufficiently different from the tasks 
previously performed by Federation unit employees because Honeywell performed IB 
program developer duties as part of her supervisory duties. 
We disagree. The record demonstrates that Honeywell performed the same at-
issue work previously performed by Federation employees in addition to her assistant 
principal work. Honeywell scheduled IB training for the teachers, met with teachers in 
congruence meetings where she collaborated with teachers regarding their lesson 
plans, made suggestions, and ensured that the lesson plans aligned with the IB 
philosophy. 
C. Change in Qualifications 
Finally, we address the Council's contention that there has been a change in the 
qualifications for the position. 
We have held that a change in qualification refers to a decision, made by the 
employer, "that employees with different qualifications will perform the work better, or 
that the nature of the work is changed and must, necessarily, be performed by 
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employees with different qualifications."9 
In this case, the record lacks any evidence of the District making such a 
decision. Murphy testified that the District decided to hire an assistant principal to . 
perform combined assistant principal and IB program developer duties solely at the 
Pulaski School so that the assistant principal would work with teachers in congruence 
but also would be able to evaluate and supervise the teachers. However, there is no 
evidence that the District made a determination that administrative qualifications are 
necessary to perform IB program developer duties. Nor is there evidence that the 
nature of the IB program developer duties changed and required performance by 
employees with different qualifications. In fact, the District's reassignment of the IB 
program.developer responsibilities to an administrator only at the Pulaski School belies 
the argument that the qualification for the position has changed. If a supervisory 
certification is necessary for the performance of IB program developer, the change 
would have been implemented for the positions at the other IB schools in the District. 
Based upon our decision, we deny the exceptions and affirm the decision of the 
ALL 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District:
 ; 
1. cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the 
work of the IB program .developer at the Casimir Pulaski School; 
9
 County of Erie and Erie Community Coll, 39 PERB ^[3005, at 3020 (2006), citing West 
Hempstead Union Free Sch Dist, 27 PERB 1f3Q96 (1981). 
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2. make Federation unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, 
lost as a result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of the IB 
program developer at the Casimir Pulaski School with interest at the 
maximum legal rate; 
3. restore to unit employees the bargaining unit work of the IB program 
• developer at the Casimir Pulaski School; 
4. sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic 
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk^witz, Chairman 
'O. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Yonkers Federation of 
Teachers, Local 860, AFL-CIO that the Yonkers City School District will: 
1. refrain from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the work of the 
IB program developer at the Casimir Pulaski School; 
2. make Federation unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost 
T
 as a result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of the IB program 
developer at the Casimir Pulaski School and with interest at the maximum 
legal rate; 
3. restore to unit employees the bargaining unit work of the IB program 
developer at the Casimir Pulaski School; 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Yonkers City School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other,material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




TOWN OF SPAFFORD, 
Respondent. 
BLITMAN & KING LLP (NATHANIEL G. LAMBRIGHT of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
HISCOCK & BARCLAY LLP (ALAN R. PETERMAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Teamsters Local 317 
(Teamsters) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an amended 
improper practice charge filed by the Teamsters alleging that the Town of Spafford 
(Town) violated §209-a.1(a) of the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally increased the amount paid by the Town's Highway Department motor 
vehicle operators (employees) toward the cost of their health insurance premiums after 
a question of representation arose. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge based upon a stipulation of facts and a certified 
copy of the Town's fiscal year 2008 budget resolution, which included the increase in 
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employee contributions for the health insurance premiums.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Teamsters argue in their exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that.there 
was no change in the status quo when the Town implemented the change in health 
insurance contribution effective January 1, 2008. The Town supports the ALJ's. 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
On September 27, 2007, the Town voted to increase the Town Highway 
Department employee health insurance premium contribution from 0.0% to 3.0%, 
effective January 1, 2008. The Teamsters sought voluntary recognition from the Town 
on behalf of the Highway Department employees on November 5, 2007. On November 
8, 2007, the Town adopted a budget resolution that included its prior determination to 
increase the employee health insurance premium contribution in the 2008 fiscal year. 
On November 30, 2007, the Town declined to voluntarily recognize the Teamsters and 
the Teamsters filed a representation petition on December 26, 2007. On January 1, 
2008, the increase in the Highway Department employee health insurance premium 
contribution was implemented. 
DISCUSSION 
An employer violates §209-a.1(a) of the Act on a perse basis when it changes 
prevailing employment conditions when a representation petition is pending because 
1
 43 PERB 114519(2010). 
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such conduct interferes with employees' statutory right of representation.2 The 
employer's obligation to maintain the status quo begins on the date it is presented with 
a bona fide representation question and continues to the date a wage and benefit 
package is fixed by collective negotiations with the newly recognized or certified 
employee organization,3 
The Teamsters argue that the Town, changed the status quo after the 
representation question arose because the increase in the health insurance contribution 
was not in effect at the time that the Teamsters sought voluntary recognition, and it 
went into effect on January 1, 2008, after the Teamsters had filed a petition to 
represent the Highway Department employees. 
We are not persuaded by the.Teamsters' argument. We found in City of • 
Coming4 that there is no violation of the Act when an employer adopts a change to 
employment conditions before a representation question arises, without notice of the 
employees' organizing activity and the change is to take effect on a date after the 
representation question arose. 
The parties stipulated that on September 27, 2007, the Town decided to 
increase the Highway Department employee health insurance premium contribution, 
2
 Village ofSuffern, 38 PERB ^3020 (2005); Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming 
BOCES, 29 PERB fl3065 (1996), confd, Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming 
BOCES v Kinsella, 30 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct Livingston County 1997); 
3
 Village ofSuffern, supra, note 2; Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 25 PERB 
P044 (1992), revdon other grounds, Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES v Kinsella, 
198 AD2d 824, 26 PERB ff7015 (4th Dept 1993). 
4
 17 PERB P022 (1984); see also, Village ofSuffern, supra note 2. 
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effective January 1, 2008. The Town's decision was incorporated into the Town's 
budget for fiscal year 2008 on November 8, 2007. There is no evidence in the 
stipulated record to indicate that the Town's September 27, 2007 vote was not final until 
the Town incorporated it into the budget. The record demonstrates that the decision 
was made weeks before the Teamsters sought voluntary recognition on November 5, 
2007 and nearly three months before the Teamsters filed its certification petition.. In 
addition, there is nothing in the parties' stipulation to support a conclusion that the 
representation question was known to the Town prior to the request for voluntary 
recognition. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's determination that there was no change in 
the status quo after the representation question arose. 
In light of our finding that the decision to increase the health insurance 
contribution occurred before the Teamsters requested voluntary recognition, the status 
quo of the terms and conditions of employment for the Highway Department employees 
included the Town's decision to raise the insurance contribution to 3.0% effective 
January 1,2008. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions and affirm the decision of the 
ALJ. 
DATED: November 9, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Qh^irman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
